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Preface 
The fight against impunity in Guatemala made international headlines, 
when then President Morales terminated the UN-backed International 
Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) in 2019 
under protest of UN Secretary-General Guterres. The very successful 
commission, which had already brought down a president, had started 
to investigate President Morales’ inner circle and family members. 
While former US administrations, which provided much of the 
commission’s funding, had supported the commission’s work, the Trump 
administration turned on it and tacitly supported the decision to end the 
mandate. 
CICIG and similar commissions set up after its model in other Latin 
American countries have received little attention in the literature to 
date. To address this gap, we are pleased to present a new Global 
Cooperation Research Paper, titled ‘The Causes and Effects of Hybrid 
Anti-impunity Commissions: Outline of a Research Agenda’. In her 
paper, Theresa Reinold, junior professor of global and transnational 
cooperation research at the University of Duisburg-Essen, proposes a 
new research agenda for these so far understudied hybrid commissions. 
This agenda should focus on the effects such commissions have on 
local justice systems as well as on the factors that contribute to their 
establishment and subsequent success or failure. Apart from a welcome 
contribution to the wider literature on hybridity, her analysis of four 
hybrid anti-impunity commissions in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador 
and Ecuador provides a helpful starting point for a broader and more 
systematic comparative analysis on why and how these commissions 
come into being, and why they succeed or fail.
Patricia Rinck (Editorial Board)
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The Causes and Effects of Hybrid Anti-impunity 
Commissions: Outline of a Research Agenda
1 Introduction
Hybridity is en vogue. In a number of issue-areas in global governance, hy-
brid solutions – which involve both international and domestic actors in the 
exercise of governance functions – have been experimented with in order to 
address the dilemma created by the export of Western templates of good gov-
ernance, democracy, the rule of law, etc. to non-Western contexts. Hybrid 
arrangements entail lower sovereignty costs than purely international mecha-
nisms, have more local legitimacy and are more attuned to local contexts – at 
least this is as far as the theory goes. The latest manifestation of this global 
trend towards hybridity are hybrid anti-impunity commissions which have 
begun to proliferate in Latin America in the past decade or so, and which are 
likely to produce ripple-effects beyond the continent. Certain parts of Latin 
America, such as the Northern Triangle, act as ideal laboratories for examin-
ing the effects of this new hybrid actor, because the problem of state capture 
by organized crime and corrupt actors is pervasive and impunity is rampant 
(WOLA 2015: 2, 8). 
Interestingly, though, the new hybrid anti-impunity commissions are barely 
known outside specialist circles and remain largely under-researched. This 
is somewhat surprising, given that some of them have been credited with 
producing ‘transcendental results’ (WOLA 2015: 27) and are considered to 
be particularly promising models worth replicating in other states (Hudson 
and Taylor 2010: 54). Their prototype was deployed in Guatemala, where 
the Comision Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG) re-
cently had to terminate its mandate after more than a decade of successful 
work. On CICIG’s website, it is emphasized that the commission is ‘unprec-
edented among UN or other international efforts to promote accountability 
and strengthen the rule of law. It has many of the attributes of an interna-
tional prosecutor, but it operates under Guatemalan law, in the Guatemalan 
courts, and it follows Guatemalan criminal procedure’.1 While CICIG did 
assume some of the sovereign prerogatives traditionally seen as falling within 
the domaine réservé of the host state, compared to international or hybrid 
criminal tribunals, CICIG entailed significantly lower sovereignty costs. An-
other difference between hybrid anti-impunity commissions such as CICIG 
1  https://www.cicig.org/history//index.php?page=about. (last accessed on 25 March 2020).
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and hybrid criminal tribunals is that the former does not use international 
law and international judges to fight impunity, but seeks to build a culture of 
the rule of law from within the host state’s legal system. In light of CICIG’s 
successes, citizens in neighboring Honduras, El Salvador, and Ecuador suc-
cessfully demanded that their governments replicate the CICIG experience in 
their respective jurisdictions, resulting in each of these countries putting a dif-
ferent spin on ‘their’ version of CICIG. Worldwide, about a dozen countries 
have contemplated setting up a similar mechanism (WOLA 2015: 29).
Hybrid anti-impunity commissions are embedded in a complex web of inter-
organizational relations, interacting (and sometimes competing) with both 
actors from the local/state- and global levels, including local justice operators, 
governments, but also their sending organization such as the United Nations 
or the Organization of American States. As such, these commissions and their 
inter-organizational relations provide instructive examples of governance ar-
rangements under conditions of polycentricity, which are fluid, complex, and 
often lack a clear order of precedence. However, the factors responsible for 
the genesis, consolidation and decay of these commissions remain largely un-
der-researched and undertheorized. Equally understudied are the medium- to 
long-term effects of these hybrids on a variety of outcomes, including the rule 
of law, democracy, and sovereignty. While a number of useful policy briefs 
have been written about CICIG and its ‘replicas’ (see, e.g., Call 2018; Call 
2019a; Call and Hallock 2020; International Crisis Group 2016; Open Soci-
ety Justice Initiative 2016; WOLA 2015), hardly any research has been car-
ried out that addresses the broader implications of the emergence of this type 
of hybrid actor for peace and conflict research. This contribution therefore 
discusses the state of the art on hybrid anti-impunity commissions and locates 
these emerging actors in the scholarship on hybridity in global governance. I 
will subsequently describe the outlines of a research agenda on these new hy-
brid commissions, arguing that, on the one hand, the effects of these mecha-
nisms require further scrutiny – how do hybrid anti-impunity commissions 
shape a variety of possible outcomes including the rule of law, statehood, 
sovereignty, democracy, and the like? On the other hand, we should investi-
gate the factors that contribute to the establishment, successes, and failures of 
these hybrids, thus treating them as outcomes to be explained. 
In the following, I will briefly review the debate about hybridity in global 
governance before providing an overview of the genesis and evolution of the 
four Latin American anti-impunity commissions. I will then outline an agenda 
for future research addressing these commissions.
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2 The Hybrid Turn in Global Governance 
In recent years, there has been a surge in scholarly interest in the notion of 
hybridity (see, e.g., Lemay-Hebert and Freedman 2017; Millar 2014; Peterson 
2012). The notion of hybridity has actually been studied in a variety of (sub-)
disciplines, including anthropology and sociology, as well as in peace and 
conflict studies and the literature on transitional justice. Hybrid governance 
solutions occupy the middle of a continuum at the ends of which we have 
either purely internal, i.e. national, or purely external forms of governance, 
respectively. Conceptualizations of hybridity abound. Levi-Faur, for instance, 
distinguishes four forms of hybridity, of which the fourth, multi-level regu-
lation, is relevant for the purposes of this paper (2011: 10–11). Multi-level 
regulation means that actors from different layers of governance are involved 
in the exercise of governance tasks. Mac Ginty in turn describes hybridity as 
a dynamic ‘process of social negotiation, conflict, and coalescence that can 
be found in all societies and social interactions. As such, there is nothing 
mysterious or unusual about the concept. Yet it is accelerated in contexts of 
transitions and internationally supported governance interventions. These so-
cieties are prone to peculiar distortions with the inflow of external resources, 
pressures, ideas, and norms resulting in hybrid political orders that are often 
a mix of traditional and imported forms of governance. Hybridity is not the 
grafting together of two discrete entities to produce a third entity. Instead, it 
is a more complex and fluid process of interchange that assumes that actors, 
norms, and practices have been previously hybridized’ (2013: 446–447). In a 
similar vein, Bargués-Pedreny and Randazzo understand hybridity as a state 
of affairs describing the interaction of external and domestic actors in peace-
building: ‘The nature of this interaction ranges from cases of compliance or 
submission – in which international actors enforce their will or, on the contra-
ry, in which local agents resist and reject external mechanisms of governance 
– to more cooperative encounters’ (2018: 1546). Hybridity is often viewed as 
an emancipatory tool in that it implies receptiveness to domestic norms and 
traditions and opens space for the involvement of local actors in governance 
tasks. At the same time, however, those who highlight the emancipatory po-
tential of hybridity also caution against romanticizing the local. While hybrid-
ity is a response to the shortcomings of purely external forms of intervention, 
one that brings local needs, norms, and practices to the fore, this does not 
mean that ‘every idea that comes from domestic actors is venerated. Studies 
on hybridity are cautious not to trace a simplistic binary in which local actors 
are equated with having positive values and qualities for peace, in contrast 
to irreverent, domineering and interest-driven international partners’ (Ibid.: 
1546). Despite this caveat, the voluminous literature on hybrid peacebuilding 
(see, e.g., Forsyth et al. 2017; Mac Ginty 2013; Mac Ginty 2010; Mac Ginty 
and Richmond 2016; Nadaradjah and Rampton 2015) tends to focus mainly 
on critiquing the liberal peace paradigm and offering normatively more ap-
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pealing alternatives. The main thrust of this scholarship is thus on normative 
and conceptual issues rather than on investigating the actual effects of hy-
bridization in a methodologically rigorous and comparative fashion, in order 
to discern if hybrid solutions are really more conducive to peacebuilding (and 
a host of other desirable outcomes such as reconciliation, human rights, the 
rule of law, democratization, etc.) than externally imposed arrangements or 
purely domestic solutions.
Another manifestation of hybridity in global governance that is a cognate 
of the commissions investigated in this research paper is the phenomenon of 
hybrid criminal tribunals, which have proliferated globally in the past couple 
of decades (see, e.g., Carolan 2008; Cohen 2007; Cruvellier 2009; Dickinson 
2003; Fichtelberg 2015; Higonnet 2005/2006; Horovitz 2013; Katzenstein 
2003; McAuliffe 2011; Nouwen 2006; Raub 2009). In contrast to the hybrid 
peace literature, the literature on hybrid criminal tribunals does address the 
empirically observable impact of hybrid tribunals on host state structures in 
more detail. Hybrid tribunals were born partly out of the realization that ‘a 
purely international process that largely bypasses the local population does 
little to help build local capacity. An international court staffed by foreigners, 
or even a local justice system operated exclusively by the UN transitional ad-
ministration, cannot hope to train local actors in necessary skills’ (Dickinson 
2003: 304). International criminal tribunals are often perceived as quick fixes 
that temporarily replace local mechanisms in the prosecution of the most 
senior perpetrators of atrocity crimes yet tend to leave domestic structures 
largely unchanged and fail to empower local actors to handle future prosecu-
tions themselves. Hybrid criminal tribunals, by contrast, seek to leave a more 
lasting imprint upon the justice systems of their host states. 
A pivotal issue in the debate about hybrid criminal tribunals has therefore 
been the concept of ‘legacy’, which can be defined as ‘a hybrid court’s last-
ing impact on bolstering the rule of law in a particular society, by conduct-
ing effective trials to contribute to ending impunity, while also strengthening 
domestic judicial capacity’ (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights 2008: 4–5). Apart from strengthening human resources 
and physical infrastructure, initiating legal reform, etc., legacy should ‘encom-
pass a shift in terms of trust in the legal system as a viable avenue for dealing 
with future conflicts and ongoing violations of human rights’ (Ibid.: 6), which 
has been called the ‘demonstration effect’ of hybrid tribunals (Ibid.: 17). It 
thus hoped that hybrid tribunals contribute to the emergence of a general 
culture of the rule of law, in that citizens develop a reasonable expectation 
that their daily lives will, as a general rule, be governed by the law, and not by 
the whims of politics, clientelistic networks, etc., and that not even the most 
powerful are exempt from this rule.
Now, even though the importance of legacy is widely recognized by scholars 
and practitioners of hybrid justice, actual successes, ‘although not entirely ab-
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sent, have been few’ (Ibid.: 5). While it is generally acknowledged that hybrid 
tribunals ought to invest in capacity-building, the devil is in the details, as the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner points out in a stocktaking 
of the performance of various hybrid tribunals in terms of legacy: ‘In Kosovo 
and Timor-Leste, the introduction of hybrid capacities was very much in re-
sponse to the immediate challenges and needs on the ground, as opposed to 
being part of a strategic and long-term international intervention. In Cam-
bodia and Sierra Leone, legacy initiatives face the political complications of 
introducing international capacities into existing domestic legal systems. In 
Sierra Leone, legacy has also been hampered by pressures to conduct trials 
within a certain time frame and allocation of resources. In Cambodia, it re-
mains to be seen whether the addition of international personnel will be suf-
ficient to withstand the political interference evident in the domestic justice 
system’ (2008: 5). The Sierra Leonean hybrid, for instance, one of the best 
researched hybrid tribunals, had established a Legacy Working Group, which 
carried out needs assessments for local institutions and offered training to 
local staff. However, observers conclude that these initiatives have had only 
a marginal impact on the Sierra Leonean justice system (Cruvellier 2009: 3; 
Horovitz 2013: 365). Analysts have attributed this to a variety of factors in-
cluding ‘lack of clear political support to prioritize legacy; pressure to fulfill 
the court’s primary mandate expeditiously; inadequate planning; the failure of 
the court and the national legal system to bridge the gaps between them; and 
the continued reliance on international staff in key posts’ (Cruvellier 2009: 3). 
Especially the latter factor has been considered critical in explaining the lack 
of empowerment of local actors (Ibid.: 31). Other hybrid tribunals have fared 
better in this regard, especially the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, where locals have played a much greater role (Ibid.: 32). 
As Alejandro Chehtman points out, whether or not domestic structures will 
be strengthened by the intervention of hybrid mechanisms largely depends 
on political will, careful planning, and proper incentives to engage in close 
collaboration between externals and locals (2013: 320). Rather than having 
internationals lecture local judges and prosecutors, or having locals simply 
observe how their international counterparts work, the most effective way 
to bolster domestic capacity turned out to be close on-the-job collaboration 
between nationals and internationals (Ibid.: 311). 
In sum, the literature on hybridity in global governance has generated some 
tentative assumptions regarding the interaction between hybrids and their 
host states. Yet these remain based on limited, case-specific evidence and have 
not yielded broader theoretical generalizations. What is more, the existing lit-
erature on hybridity in global governance has largely ignored the emergence 
of the new hybrid actors that are the subjects of this paper, even though in-
sights from this field of research could potentially illuminate the workings of 
hybridity in other issue-areas of global governance. Therefore, in the remain-
der of this research paper, I will trace the genesis of the new hybrids in Latin 
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America and sketch the outlines of a research agenda that would address the 
origins and effects of this new actor in global governance. 
3 Hybrid Anti-impunity Commissions: CICIG, 
MACCIH, CICIES, and CEICCE
Anti-impunity commissions are a new sub-type of hybrid actor, the function-
ing of which very much reflects the above-mentioned dynamics of ‘social ne-
gotiation, conflict, and coalescence’ (Mac Ginty 2013: 446). In contrast to 
other forms of hybrid governance such as hybrid criminal tribunals, anti-im-
punity commissions are characterized by moderate levels of delegation, lower 
sovereignty costs, and a deep enmeshment of the hybrid in the host state’s 
domestic structures. The prototype of this new hybrid actor was established 
in Guatemala, where CICIG was created in 2006 pursuant to an agreement 
between the United Nations (UN) and the Guatemalan government. When 
the commission was forced to terminate its work thirteen years later, this was 
not because it was so ineffective but because it was so effective: when it began 
investigating corruption charges against then-president Morales’ inner circle 
and later Morales himself, the latter first sought to obstruct CICIG’s work 
and subsequently decided not to renew its mandate. CICIG had thus become 
a victim of its own success. Its quantifiable achievements are impressive in-
deed: CICIG achieved a 25% reduction in impunity and investigated over 
200 cases that led to charges against more than 160 high-level government 
officials including former and incumbent presidents, a vice president, former 
ministers, former police chiefs, army representatives, politicians, businessmen, 
drug-traffickers, etc. (Transparency International Defence and Security 2017: 
8). Survey data indicate high rates of public approval of CICIG in particular, 
with CICIG becoming the most trusted institution in Guatemala (Zamora 
2019: 586); at the same time, public trust in the justice system in general in-
creased by ten percent during CICIG’s period of operation (Ibid.). 
CICIG’s mandate had a unique focus on strengthening investigations and 
prosecutions as well as contributing to the reform of the judicial system. On 
the one hand, CICIG was mandated to investigate and (co-)prosecute illegal 
security apparatuses and clandestine security organizations (CIACS) that have 
infiltrated all sectors of the Guatemalan state (Comision Internacional Contra 
la Impunidad en Guatemala 2006). It was authorized to initiate investiga-
tions on its own but needed the cooperation of Guatemalan authorities for 
prosecutions, which it was allowed to join as a private prosecutor (Ibid.). This 
combination of prerogatives was unusual and represented a concession to 
sovereignty concerns voiced by the Guatemalan Constitutional Court, which 
stripped away the independent prosecutorial powers CICIG was originally 
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intended to enjoy. Even with this more limited mandate, the establishment of 
CICIG entailed certain sovereignty costs for Guatemala. The exercise of both 
investigatory and prosecutorial powers under national law by a hybrid com-
mission was a first in the history of anti-corruption initiatives (Krylova 2018: 
96). CICIG moreover had the authority to identify civil servants who had 
committed administrative offences and participate in disciplinary proceedings 
against them. Crucially, in terms of longer-term structural reform, CICIG was 
empowered to initiate legislative proposals for combating impunity. 
While CICIG produced solid results in the first years of its existence, its task 
seemed Sisyphean: ‘As late as 2014, it did not seem to matter how many cases 
CICIG and the Office of the Public Prosecutor mounted against corrupt presi-
dents, ministers, military officers, government employees, mayors, members 
of Congress, police, judges, or lawyers … the temporary vacuums would be 
filled by new actors eager to bend the country’s deeply ingrained clientelistic 
structures and practices to their benefit’ (Open Society Justice Initiative 2016: 
39). This changed in 2015, when CICIG’s investigations triggered a political 
earthquake which offered ‘Guatemala its best hope for change in 20 years’ 
(Ibid.). CICIG and the ministerio publico (MP) had exposed two massive 
corruption scandals (called La Linea and the IGSS – Guatemalan Institute of 
Social Security – scandal) which implicated high-level officials from president 
Molina’s inner circle, including vice president Baldetti – and later Molina 
himself. The revelations triggered large-scale street protests which became 
known as the ‘Guatemalan Spring’. Baldetti eventually resigned and was later 
arrested. Further investigations produced incriminating evidence that Baldetti 
and Molina themselves were the ringleaders of La Linea. Molina was ulti-
mately forced to step down as well and was stripped of his immunity. He was 
subsequently arrested and is still awaiting trial. The democratic awakening 
triggered by CICIG’s investigations is widely seen as one of the commission’s 
most important achievements: ‘Its signal legacy is demonstrating to a jaded 
Guatemalan citizenry that the most powerful people in the country can be 
held to account for criminal behavior. Interview after interview, including of 
legislative and civil society opponents of CICIG, highlighted this achievement 
by the international mission. The mission also demonstrated that, given the 
political space, national judicial institutions could work’ (Call and Hallock 
2020: 65). 
It is too early, however, to assess the long-term effects of CICIG’s work. Upon 
leaving Guatemala last fall, the commission recognized that its efforts had not 
been sufficient to transform the state. CICIG had almost gotten to the nucleus 
of the CIACS that had captured the state yet also stressed that lasting change 
was inhibited by the vested interests of powerful segments of society – a ‘ma-
fia coalition’ of politicians, business leaders, and private individuals ‘willing 
to sacrifice Guatemala’s present and future to guarantee impunity’ (quoted in 
The Guardian 2019). With a new president – who is said to be involved with 
those criminal networks that CICIG was hired to dismantle in the first place 
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(and who was once himself under investigation by CICIG) – the current po-
litical climate has become rather hostile (Burt and Estrada 2020). 
Just like in Guatemala, the Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption 
and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH) was created as a result of civil society 
pressure. In 2014, the discovery of a massive corruption scheme involving 
the Honduran Social Security Institute caused popular outrage, with tens of 
thousands of protesters demanding the resignation of president Hernandez 
and the establishment of a Honduran variant of CICIG. While CICIG was es-
tablished pursuant to an agreement between the Guatemalan government and 
the UN, MACCIH came into existence through an accord between Honduras 
and the secretary general of the Organization of American States (OAS). It 
began operations in 2016 and terminated its work four years later, after presi-
dent Hernandez refused to extend its mandate (Organization of American 
States 2020). And just like CICIG, MACCIH had become a victim of its own 
success, because its anti-corruption investigations had gotten in the way of 
the country’s powerful, including Hernandez and members of the legislature, 
who were investigated by the attorney general with the support of MACCIH 
and voted to shut down the commission in 2019 (Avalos and Robbins 2020). 
Yet despite persistent attacks, MACCIH still produced solid results during its 
brief lifespan. It assisted in the prosecution of 133 people and 14 cases (Or-
ganization of American States 2020), notably in the high-profile investigations 
against former first lady Bonilla de Lobo, who was ultimately convicted of 
fraud and embezzlement and sentenced to 58 years in prison (Reuters 2019). 
Just like CICIG, MACCIH thus demonstrated to the Honduran citizenry that 
even the most powerful were not above the law (Chamorro 2020).
Whereas CICIG was mandated to investigate (yet not prosecute) indepen-
dently, MACCIH depended for both investigations and prosecutions on the 
cooperation of its Honduran partners. Article 3 of the agreement establishing 
MACCIH provides for the Mission’s ‘active collaboration’ with Honduran 
authorities on corruption cases, authorizing it to ‘accompany, assist, super-
vise, and evaluate’ state institutions investigating and prosecuting corruption 
(Organization of American States 2016). Stripping MACCIH of its powers to 
co-prosecute cases was likely a concession to the Honduran government fear-
ing a commission with teeth (Zamora 2019: 593–594). 
In comparison to its Guatemalan counterpart, MACCIH is generally – ‘per-
haps unfairly’ – seen as less successful (Call 2019a: 2). However, one should 
also keep in mind that MACCIH was a rather short-lived institution and that 
CICIG was equally considered a disappointment in the first years of its exist-
ence: ‘Ultimately, MACCIH started off strong despite a somewhat weaker 
mandate. It took some months to get up and running, then helped draft im-
portant laws that won passage ... It worked with the Public Ministry to secure 
the convictions of twelve individuals, including two ex-vice ministers and a 
magistrate of the Judicial Council, in its first two years’ (Ibid.: 38–39). Over-
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all, both CICIG and MACCIH have been much more successful than initially 
anticipated (Ibid.: 8).
Further ripple effects of CICIG’s work could be observed in El Salvador, 
which recently agreed to the establishment of a CICIG-offshoot (Renteria 
2019) after Nayib Bukele was elected president and made good on its cam-
paign promise to establish an anti-corruption mission inspired by the mod-
els of CICIG and MACCIH (Call 2019a: 2). With three of his presidential 
predecessors investigated for corruption allegations, the issue of corruption 
featured prominently in Bukele’s electoral campaign and apparently struck a 
nerve with many voters (Foster 2020). The International Commission Against 
Impunity in El Salvador (CICIES) was therefore established in order to ‘sup-
port, strengthen and actively collaborate with the institutions of the Republic 
of El Salvador charged with preventing, investigating and punishing acts of 
corruption and other related crimes, including crimes related to public fi-
nances, illicit enrichment, money laundering, and national and transnational 
organized crime’ (Organization of American States 2019). The exact scope of 
its mandate, however, is yet to be defined. Observers believe that CICIES will 
entail insignificant sovereignty costs in that it is probably merely a technical 
advisory mission rather than a mission with investigatory or (co)prosecutorial 
powers (Chamorro 2020). Like MACCIH and unlike CICIG, CICIES was cre-
ated pursuant to an agreement (or rather a number of agreements) between 
the OAS and El Salvador. There is considerable confusion about CICIES’ ac-
tual powers, owing to the fact that president Bukele is said to have rushed the 
creation of CICIES in order to make good on its campaign promise to estab-
lish a hybrid commission within the first 100 days of his tenure (Quintanilla 
and Caceres 2020). Yet, as observers point out, it will take quite some time 
before CICIES will begin its actual work (Call 2019b). Regarding the scope 
of its mandate, a recent commentary concludes that CICIES, ‘as it currently 
stands, will act more as a technical advisor than as a commission dedicated to 
investigating corruption cases’ (Quintanilla and Caceres 2020). Apparently, 
CICIES’ mandate is limited to identifying corruption offenses committed by 
the executive including the ministries, notifying the MP and offering techni-
cal advice to the MP and other institutions (Ibid.). The main hurdle to giving 
CICIES investigatory powers similar to CICIG’s or MACCIH’s – as Bukele 
had promised during his campaign – is article 193 of the Salvadoran consti-
tution, which confers exclusive investigatory and prosecutorial powers upon 
the attorney general’s office (Ibid.). This, however, stands in contradiction to 
article 6.1.1 of CICIES’ agreement with the Salvadoran presidency, according 
to which CICIES will provide ‘technical assistance, accompaniment, and ac-
tive collaboration in the investigation, criminal prosecution, and punishment 
of acts of corruption just as in the dismantling of networks of corruption’ 
(quoted in Ibid.). This, analysts have pointed out, is not only at odds with the 
agreement concluded between CICIES and the attorney general’s office, but, 
more importantly, is incompatible with the Salvadoran constitution (Ibid.). 
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If CICIES were thus to be given teeth, this would have to occur through a 
legislative process addressing these constitutional hurdles, yet none of the 
accords establishing CICIES contain measures aimed at overcoming this con-
stitutional roadblock (Ibid.).
A fourth hybrid commission is currently being established in Ecuador and 
to date, very little is known about this new body. Last year, president Lenin 
Moreno made good on one of his central campaign promises and announced 
the creation of the Comision de los Expertos Internacionales Contra la Cor-
rupcion en Ecuador (CEICCE) via executive decree (Presidencia de la Re-
publica de Ecuador 2019). Like CICIG (and unlike MACCIH and CICIES) 
CEICCE was established pursuant to an agreement between the UN and the 
host state. Compared to CICIG and MACCIH, CEICCE’s ambitions are more 
modest: just like CICIES, CEICCE will not have investigatory powers but is 
envisaged as an expert commission, which is tasked to provide advice to the 
judicial organs of the state of Ecuador. It shall conclude bilateral contracts 
with local institutions in charge of preventing, investigating and sanctioning 
acts of corruption in order to ‘assist and fortify’ them (Ibid.). CEICCE shall 
moreover receive complaints and propose public policies aimed at fighting 
corruption. Creating CEICCE via presidential decree certainly accelerated the 
process yet also cast doubt on the autonomy of the commission from the 
executive. Additionally, analysts fear that the commission might be dissolved 
with the same ease it was created (Pozas 2019). Compared to CICIG, the 
most complete model of the four anti-impunity commissions, CEICCE has 
only weak competencies and does not require a significant concession of sov-
ereign privileges from its host state (Ibid.).
In sum, each of the replicas put its own spin on the CICIG prototype, which 
had the most far-reaching powers compared to the other hybrids. At the same 
time, CICIG was the most successful Latin American hybrid (so far). In the 
following section, a research agenda focusing on the impact of these commis-
sions will be outlined, which should take into account, inter alia, the ques-
tion of how the degree of delegation of sovereign prerogatives – which varies 
widely among CICIG, MACCIH, CICIES, and CEICCE – affects their perfor-
mance.
4 Hybrid Anti-impunity Commissions as Causes
Hybrid anti-impunity commissions are purportedly established to strengthen 
national justice systems and consolidate the rule of law. To what extent they 
actually have this effect remains unclear, however. Two sets of questions in 
particular require further research: to begin with, how does the level of dele-
gation affect a hybrid’s impact upon host state structures, especially the justice 
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system? And secondly, how does this impact vary in the short-, medium-, and 
long-term? Put differently, what confluence of factors is required to achieve a 
longer-term transformation of the local justice system?
The existing literature offers only limited insights into these questions. Shared-
sovereignty arrangements – of which the new hybrids are a sub-type – ‘in-
volve the engagement of external actors in some of the domestic authority 
structures of the target state’ (Krasner 2004: 108), yet unfortunately these 
mechanisms remain largely ‘underanalyzed and undertheorized’ (Matanock 
2014: 2). What remains poorly understood, for instance, is how the depth of 
delegation affects the provision of public goods. Whereas international and 
hybrid criminal tribunals involve deep delegation, anti-impunity commissions 
require only partial delegation and consequently entail comparatively lower 
sovereignty costs. Does that make them less successful in promoting the rule 
of law than more intrusive arrangements? In order to answer this question, 
two types of comparative case studies should be carried out: one involving 
variation across different categories of sovereignty-infringing institutions, for 
instance studies comparing hybrid criminal tribunals on the one hand to hy-
brid anti-impunity commissions on the other hand. Another type of compara-
tive study could explore the effects of variation within a specific category of 
institutions, contrasting hybrid anti-impunity commissions that involve mod-
erate levels of delegation to those requiring only shallow delegation. Can we 
simply assume that the more delegation, the better? And does this generaliza-
tion hold not only for hybrid actors of the same category, but also across cat-
egories of hybrid actors? It does seem intuitively plausible to expect the depth 
of delegation to be positively correlated with a consolidation of the rule of 
law, in that actors with greater competencies and responsibilities should have 
a more significant impact on public goods provision in the host state than ac-
tors with lesser powers that depend upon the (often wavering) cooperation 
of local authorities (Matanock 2014: 3).2 On this view, the ‘external actor is 
most effective when reestablishing the rules through its own structures, rather 
than having to work within the state’s structure’ (Ibid.: 6). 
Now, even a cursory glance at the performance of hybrid anti-impunity com-
missions suggests that the deterministic assumption about the greater effec-
tiveness of arrangements involving full rather than partial delegation does 
not hold. Future research thus needs to address the complexities of this causal 
relationship in more detail. In the following, I will merely adduce some pre-
liminary evidence from the cases of CICIG and MACCIH to cast doubt on the 
argument about the effectiveness of full delegation and demonstrate the need 
for more nuance. The main problem with full delegation is that it is unlikely 
to transform host state structures in the long-term. Hybrid arrangements such 
as CICIG and MACCIH, by contrast, which shared tasks and responsibilities 
with local actors, had strong incentives to empower the latter to make coop-
2  Provided the former are equipped with the necessary resources of course.
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eration more effective. CICIG and MACCIH thus turned a seeming weakness 
into an asset: as they were highly dependent upon cooperation with their local 
counterparts, they carefully built alliances and ensured that their collabora-
tion partners would be trustworthy, untarnished by corruption allegations, 
and possessed the necessary skills and resources for effective investigations 
and prosecutions. Ultimately, local Guatemalan and Honduran authorities 
were the ones that made the final decisions. Since neither CICIG nor MAC-
CIH had the powers to overrule poorly made decisions, they had to pre-empt 
bad decision-making by putting in place staff and infrastructure that would 
ensure that sound decisions were made. CICIG therefore launched reforms 
that led to the establishment of specialized high-risk tribunals (Tribunals de 
Mayor Riesgo) as well as of a special unit within the MP (the Fiscalia Especial 
Contra la Impunidad, FECI), which were ‘central to its judicial successes and 
represented a strategic foothold in the judicial system where citizens could 
have confidence that corruption had not penetrated’ (Call and Hallock 2020: 
66). FECI staff were selected and vetted by CICIG and the attorney general 
and enjoyed a privileged position inside the MP in that they worked on a con-
fidential basis and separately from the rest of the ministry (Open Society Jus-
tice Initiative 2016: 100). The collaboration between CICIG and FECI staff 
has been considered the commission’s ‘most effective capacity-building work’ 
(Ibid.: 102). New staff were trained-on-the-job rather than through seminars 
and workshops, and knowledge was thus effectively transferred. CICIG also 
contributed to the establishment of the Criminal Analysis Division as well as 
the creation of new group-oriented methods of investigation, which enabled 
the prosecution of entire criminal networks rather than individual suspects. 
This, together with other reform initiatives launched by CICIG such as the 
introduction of wiretapping, witness protection programs, plea bargaining 
provisions, etc. significantly strengthened local investigatory and prosecuto-
rial capacities. 
Overall CICIG’s presence has helped fortify core judicial structures such as 
the MP and the courts, which, according to one observer, have ‘reestablished 
themselves as strong, independent institutions’ (Zamora 2019: 589–590). The 
hope is that because CICIG created islands of trained and committed person-
nel within each institution it cooperated with, this will have a spillover effect 
onto the legal system as a whole (Hudson and Taylor 2010: 70–71). Similar 
trends could be observed as a result of MACCIH’s work in Honduras. MAC-
CIH initiated the creation of specialized anti-corruption infrastructure within 
the local legal system such as specialized court chambers – which were much 
more effective than regular courts – and a special prosecutorial unit within 
the MP, the Unidad Fiscal Especial Contra la Impunidad y la Corrupción 
(UFECIC, akin to the Guatemalan FECI), which were key to the mission’s 
success (Chamorro 2020). MACCIH screened and trained UFECIC staff and 
selected cases for investigation, thus seeking to create an island of commit-
ted staff untarnished by corruption within the MP. It was just this island that 
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became the main sticking point in negotiations over the extension of MAC-
CIH’s mandate: ‘MACCIH endured a troubled tenure, but nonetheless forged 
an increasingly promising alliance with UFECIC ... Accountability for high-
level corruption, however incipient and fragile, was apparently not well re-
ceived by some in Tegucigalpa. As MACCIH’s mandate came up for renewal, 
negotiations between the Honduran government and the OAS centered on 
the mission’s relationship with UFECIC and its ability to continue support-
ing criminal investigations, which the government sought to discontinue. The 
OAS apparently balked at this demand, and with negotiations at a stalemate, 
MACCIH’S mandate was allowed to expire’ (Camilleri and Christie 2020). 
Both MACCHI and CICIG thus demonstrated that local institutions – with 
appropriate backing and insulation from political interference – can and do 
deliver in the fight against impunity. At the same time, however, it remains 
unclear to what extent the local capacities they created will survive in the long 
run. Will FECI or UFECIC, for instance, be able to stand on their own two 
feet, or does the departure of the hybrid commissions also signal the end of 
their local collaborators? Future research investigating the effects of the new 
hybrids on a variety of outcomes should thus differentiate between short-, 
medium-, and long-term effects.
The most certain inferences can be made with regard to short-term effects, 
where hybrid anti-impunity commissions were rather successful in strength-
ening the rule of law in their host states. As discussed above, this was likely 
due to the fact that they involved only moderate levels of delegation, which 
forced them to strengthen local structures rather than circumvent them. A 
quick glance at another hybrid mechanism outside of Latin American bears 
this assumption out: in Kosovo, the EULEX mission (2008–2020) operated 
almost in parallel to CICIG in Guatemala, yet was equipped with more far-
reaching competencies and thus entailed a significant concession of sovereign 
prerogatives. Compared to CICIG, however, EULEX yielded only disappoint-
ing results. EULEX is the largest and most ambitious civilian mission under 
the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), combining execu-
tive functions with a mandate for justice sector reform and capacity-building. 
Just like CICIG and MACCIH, EULEX is fully integrated into the local legal 
system; yet in contrast to its Latin American counterparts, EULEX enjoys a 
broad set of prerogatives. Its powers are specified as follows: EULEX shall, 
inter alia, ‘monitor, mentor and advise the competent Kosovo institutions on 
all areas related to the wider rule of law … whilst retaining certain executive 
responsibilities’; promote the rule of law, public order and security – if nec-
essary through overruling or reversing decisions taken by local authorities; 
ensure that local authorities operate in an unbiased manner; and ensure that 
cases of grave human rights violations, organized crime, corruption and oth-
er offenses are ‘properly investigated, prosecuted, adjudicated and enforced’ 
– if necessary by international investigators, prosecutors and judges operat-
ing alongside or independently of their local counterparts (European Union 
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2008). EULEX is moreover tasked with mentoring, monitoring and advising 
(MMA) local authorities (EULEX 2010). In terms of impact on the rule of 
law, EULEX’s intervention has yielded disappointing results. The European 
Court of Auditors found EULEX’s performance to be largely unsatisfactory, 
‘particularly with regard to organised crime and corruption’ (2012: 6). The 
auditors criticized that since EULEX judges and prosecutors also carry out 
executive functions, they have less time left for capacity-building (Ibid.: 16, 
19). Even though MMA measures had somewhat strengthened the capacities 
of local justice operators, the latter were still not capable of dealing with com-
plex cases involving organized crime, corruption, or war crimes (Ibid.: 19). 
Overall, the audit concludes, ‘EU assistance to Kosovo in the field of the rule 
of law has not been sufficiently effective. Assistance has made only a modest 
contribution to building the capacity of the Kosovo police and little progress 
has been made in the fight against organised crime’ (Ibid.: 35).3 In contrast 
to CICIG or MACCIH, EULEX had the privilege of simply circumventing or 
overruling corrupt or incompetent local partners. Consequently, EULEX did 
not make sufficient efforts at building local capacity because from a short-
term perspective it was easier to bypass dysfunctional local mechanisms than 
to substantially transform them.
In sum, then, even a cursory glance at the legacy of different hybrids indi-
cates that the simplistic assumption about a unilinear relationship between 
the depth of delegation and success of the mission does not hold. The hybrids 
discussed in this article range from deep delegation (EULEX) to moderate or 
partial delegation (CICIG) to shallow delegation (MACCIH) to no delega-
tion at all (CEICCE and CICIES, based on what is currently known about 
their mandate). While CEICCE and CICIES are nascent institutions whose 
effects cannot be assessed yet, a comparison of EULEX, CICIG, and MAC-
CIH suggests that deep delegation does not produce a greater impact on the 
rule of law; on the contrary, sharing responsibilities and competencies more 
evenly among externals and locals actually contributes to peer-learning and 
thus capacity-building, which will probably make advances in the rule of 
law more sustainable in the medium-to-long term. But again, this hypothesis 
would require further research. While we now know that deep delegation has 
its drawbacks, this of course does not imply that the less delegation, the bet-
ter. While CICIES and CEICCE – the two hybrid commissions displaying the 
lowest levels of delegation – have not established a track record yet and thus 
their impact cannot be assessed at the moment, it seems unlikely that these 
3  A number of policy briefs evaluating EULEX’s track record are equally pessimistic. One 
report concludes that instead of empowering the local judiciary, ‘a certain dependence has 
paradoxically been generated, with the Kosovar judges submitting to their international 
colleagues’ (Llaudes and Andrada 2015). Another report echoes this criticism: ‘EULEX 
has overwhelmingly exercised its executive functions and has failed to sufficiently design 
local-majority panels in serious and complex criminal cases ... This is an unfortunate 
legacy given that local participation and ownership are necessary for developing an expe-
rienced and professional Kosovo judicial culture’ (Welski 2014).
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actors will leave a major imprint upon the justice systems of El Salvador and 
Ecuador, respectively. Providing technical advice and receiving complaints 
about malfeasance will hardly be sufficient to change endemic practices of 
corruption and a deeply-ingrained culture of impunity. Rather, it seems that a 
mandate to investigate and (co-)prosecute cases of corruption and organized 
crime – and hence a medium-level of delegation – would have been desirable 
for these commissions. However, more research is necessary in order to iden-
tify the optimal level of delegation for these kinds of contexts. 
5 Hybrid Anti-impunity Commissions as Out-
comes
The preceding section discussed the effects of hybrid anti-impunity commis-
sions, thus treating them as causes producing outcomes. Of course it would be 
equally possible to study these commissions as outcomes themselves, and ask, 
for instance, which factors have led to their establishment, consolidation, and 
decline. Obviously, these actors do not operate in isolation from their political 
context, and the recent expulsion of both CICIG and MACCIH – despite (or 
rather because of) their strong performance – suggests that we need to look at 
their organizational environment in order to understand why they thrive and 
why they fail. This organizational environment comprises a host of poten-
tially relevant factors, which can each be associated with different approaches 
in International Relations (IR) theory.
The first question that arises in this context is why governments that are 
themselves often repressive, corrupt, and/or involved with organized crime 
would establish anti-impunity commissions in the first place. Commitment 
to international norms (or lack thereof) has been extensively debated in the 
discipline of International Relations. IR-realists paint a rather bleak picture: 
as the international system is anarchic and dominated by a logic of self-help 
(Waltz 1979: 107, 111), accepting the constraints of international law is seen 
as imprudent and potentially suicidal. Realists therefore have difficulties ac-
counting for governments’ commitment to international norms. IR-liberals 
and constructivists in turn are better equipped to solve the puzzle of why sov-
ereigns would accept constraints on their power when signing international 
treaties. Liberalism assumes that governmental commitment to international 
norms is the result of domestic pressure (Moravcsik 2000). Constructivism 
proposes that governments become socialized into law-abiding behavior by 
a coalition of transnational advocacy networks and rights-protecting govern-
ments (Risse et al. 1999). On this view, commitment to certain norms – which 
may initially be a tactical response to outside or domestic pressure – over time 
leads to attitude change and thus norm internalization. 
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Emily Hafner-Burton et al. in their study of repressive governments’ ratifica-
tion patterns challenge this argument, however, pointing out that a number of 
studies have actually refuted the constructivist approach. Instead, the authors 
maintain that ‘many repressors commit to the regime without any apparent 
intention of changing their human rights practices’ (2008: 121). Hafner-Bur-
ton et al. therefore propose an alternative account inspired by sociological 
institutionalism. Sociological institutionalists submit that organizations can-
not be understood in isolation from their institutional environment (Parsons 
1956), and that organizations mimic other organizations whom they view as 
successful and in so doing hope to ensure their own survival (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983: 152). By becoming isomorphic with their institutional environ-
ment, organizations seek legitimacy, status, etc. as members of an organiza-
tional field (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 347ff). Emulation does not imply norm 
internalization, however, which explains why organizations frequently fail to 
comply with the standards they have set for themselves. The ‘decoupling’ of 
organizational practice from structural elements allows the organization ‘to 
maintain standardized, legitimating, formal structures while their activities 
vary in response to practical considerations’ (Ibid.: 357). According to socio-
logical institutionalists, global scripts prescribing standards of human rights, 
good governance, the rule of law, etc. define and legitimate the policies of na-
tion-states and other actors ‘in virtually all of the domains of rationalized so-
cial life’ (Meyer et al. 1997: 145). In line with the basic tenets of sociological 
institutionalism, Hafner-Burton et al. therefore posit that subscribing to inter-
national standards of good governance, democracy, human rights, etc. ‘creates 
opportunities for rights-violating governments to display low-cost legitimat-
ing commitments to world norms’ (2008: 115), even when they have neither 
the capacity nor the intention to actually implement those norms (Ibid.: 126). 
Yet embracing these norms at least on paper has ‘great legitimating value for 
nation-states. The subscribing sovereign gains, or claims, legitimacy in the 
eyes of superior sovereigns, peers, internal and external competitors, and in-
ternal subordinate groups and interests. And the price for this commodity is 
low, as enforcement is often little called into question’ (Ibid.: 116). 
In sum, even though the new hybrids do not figure in the IR-theoretical litera-
ture reviewed above, the latter’s assumptions could be fruitfully applied to the 
study of anti-impunity commissions. In the following, I will use the example 
of CICIG (as it is the most well-researched of the four anti-impunity commis-
sions) to subject the assumptions put forward by the different IR-theories to 
a preliminary test. The results indicate that parsimonious theories seeking to 
identify a single explanatory variable – or at least to narrow multiple causal 
influences down to a single level of analysis – cannot account for the spread 
of the new hybrids. Rather, it seems that the proliferation we are currently 
witnessing is due to a confluence of factors from different levels of analysis. 
The initial impetus for the creation of CICIG actually came from civil society, 
which, in 2002, had suggested the creation of an international commission to 
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investigate threats emanating from the remnants of the Guatemalan military’s 
counterinsurgency intelligence networks that had survived the country’s long-
running civil war and were threatening human rights in present-day Guate-
mala (Open Society Justice Initiative 2016: 4). When the United Nations got 
involved in the discussion, it suggested a beefed-up commission which would 
have the powers to both investigate and prosecute under Guatemalan law, 
‘because it saw broader, and graver, menaces to state stability from rapidly 
growing national and transnational organized crime groups overwhelming 
frail, and often-compromised, state institutions’ (Ibid.). Alfonso Portillo, then-
President of Guatemala, thus signed an accord providing for the creation of 
an ‘International Commission Against Illegal Security Groups and Clandes-
tine Security Organizations’ (CICIACS), which was rejected by both Congress 
and the Constitutional Court, however (Ibid.). President Portillo’s decision 
to cede part of the state’s sovereign prerogatives to CICIACS was allegedly 
primarily motivated by the administration’s desire to enhance its legitimacy. 
Portillo was well aware of the country’s poor image and the importance of 
mending fences with core allies such as the US and the UN (Dudley 2018: 
33). Portillo had come to power with the help of the old military guard, in-
cluding General Efrain Rios Montt, who had committed atrocities during 
the civil war (Montt would be later convicted of genocide), and thus the Por-
tillo administration had ‘exceptionally little credibility in the human rights 
field and only limited support among the educated middle class or the press’ 
(Mersky and Roht-Arriaza 2007: 11). Some presidential staff members had a 
background in human rights and advised Portillo that in order to legitimate 
his administration internationally, he should position himself as a champion 
of human rights (Ibid.). For Portillo, supporting the CICIACS initiative was 
thus a seemingly ‘low-cost gesture to the international community and human 
rights NGOs’ (Open Society Justice Initiative 2016:  29). 
In 2004, Portillo was succeeded by Oscar Berger. Whereas Berger himself was 
seemingly rather indifferent, his deputy Eduardo Stein, who was said to be 
‘politically independent and forward thinking’ (Dudley 2018: 34), became 
increasingly concerned with organized crime in Guatemala and lobbied per-
sistently for a CICIACS successor organization. Stein and Interior Minister 
Carlos Vielman became critical proponents of the proposal for what would 
later become CICIG. They lobbied important domestic players and also trave-
led to Washington, D.C., to persuade the US to throw its full force behind the 
proposal (Ibid.: 35). The presence of Vielman – a conservative politician who 
would later be accused of extrajudicial killings – was helpful to persuade the 
traditional business elites to endorse the establishment of an anti-impunity 
commission, although their motivations remain unclear: ‘There is some dis-
pute about whether they saw the CICIG as a possible tool to use against 
their bureaucratic and emerging elite rivals … Stein, however, disputed this 
assertion. He said the elites close to the government took a more hands-off 
approach. They may not have thought the proposal was good, but they did 
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not think it would affect them in any significant way. And in the best-case sce-
nario, they thought that they might benefit’ (Ibid.). Stein also involved mem-
bers of civil society, legal experts, as well as the head of the president’s human 
rights council, Frank la Rue, in exploring options for the establishment of an 
anti-impunity commission that would pass the constitutional and political 
hurdles CICIACS had not been able to overcome (Open Society Justice Initia-
tive 2016: 33). 
The modified proposal establishing CICIACS successor organization CICIG 
still encountered domestic resistance but was approved in late 2007 due to a 
confluence of factors (Ibid.: 17). President Berger had stalled on CICIG and 
only forwarded the CICIG agreement to Congress for ratification when a po-
litical scandal over the slaying of three El Salvadoran members of the Central 
American Parliament (Parlacen) and their driver, who were on their way to 
Guatemala City, shook the country (Ibid.: 36). While the murder in and of 
itself was shocking, its aftermath was politically even more consequential, as 
a number of Guatemalan police officers who had been arrested for the crime 
were subsequently executed inside a maximum-security prison, which sug-
gested the infiltration of the national police by criminal networks (Ibid.). The 
scandal prompted Berger to send the CICIG proposal to the Congress for-
eign affairs committee, which, despite a favorable ruling by the Constitutional 
Court, rejected the CICIG agreement as being in violation of the constitution. 
This caused another political uproar, especially because at least one of the 
Congressmen on the foreign affairs committee who had voted against the 
CICIG agreement was apparently linked to organized crime. The public out-
rage created by the apparent infiltration of state structures by criminal agents 
ultimately shamed Congress into approving the CICIG agreement (Ibid.: 37).
While domestic dynamics were thus crucial in the establishment of CICIG, 
external factors also played a role. CICIG was strongly promoted (and fund-
ed) by a number of European states and – most critically – the United States: 
‘These states were instrumental in lobbying the Guatemalan government for 
approval of the CICIG agreement, ensuring strong support in the UN General 
Assembly and Secretariat, and moving to CICIG’s defense when the Com-
mission came under attack in Guatemala. The Commission could not have 
functioned without this political support’ (Ibid.: 104). Support from these 
countries proved to be vital at every critical juncture CICIG faced. ‘The most 
decisive pressure’ came from the US (Ibid.: 77): ‘Narcotrafficking and illegal 
migration had been American priorities in Guatemala for two decades, and 
CICIG, in conjunction with the Office of the Public Prosecutor under Clau-
dia Paz y Paz, and now under Thelma Aldana, had proved effective allies in 
the arrest and extradition of major drug traffickers ... The U.S. leverage was 
a new Central American assistance program, the Alliance for the Prosperity 
of the Northern Triangle of Central America, offering some $1 billion in aid 
for security, good governance, and economic growth programs to address the 
causes of migration’ (Ibid.: 79). Yet despite increasing pressure from all sides, 
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president Molina remained adamant in his opposition to CICIG, not knowing 
that soon thereafter the Guatemalan Spring would propel CICIG to fame and 
himself to prison.
Despite its stellar successes in resolving the La Linea scandal and bringing 
down a corrupt president and his deputy, CICIG continued to face domes-
tic pressures that would ultimately lead to its downfall. When CICIG began 
investigating corruption charges against Molina’s successor Jimmy Morales’ 
inner circle and later Morales himself, the latter first sought to obstruct CI-
CIG’s work and subsequently decided not to renew its mandate. This time, 
however, corruption won the day, and CICIG had to terminate its mandate in 
2019 after many years of successful work. How was this possible? A major 
factor was that in contrast to its predecessors, the Trump administration had 
little interest in supporting CICIG, and thus a window of opportunity opened 
up for domestic proponents of impunity to rid themselves of the commission. 
Trump, adopting a ‘transactional’ approach to foreign policy – making short-
term cost-benefit-calculations rather than adopting a longer-term principled 
approach – had decided to sacrifice the goal of anti-impunity in return for 
political favors by the Guatemalan government, more specifically Morales’ 
promise to move Guatemala’s embassy in Israel to Jerusalem and cooperate 
on migration issues (Camilleri and Christie 2020). 
Domestically, the population at large continued to strongly support CICIG: 
thousands protested against Morales’ decision to expel CICIG and several 
candidates for the presidential office in Guatemala’s 2019 elections pledged 
support for a renewal of CICIG’s mandate, but none of them received enough 
votes to participate in the runoff election last August. ‘There is a high level 
of support for CICIG. But people did not manage to translate that into clear 
political party positions,’ Jose Carlos Sanabria, a researcher at the Association 
for Research and Social Studies, observed (quoted in Cuffe 2019). The Trump 
administration’s ‘tacit green light’ to expel CICIG (Cuffe 2019) and wavering 
domestic support thus ultimately sealed the deal and led to the demise of the 
most successful anti-impunity commission so far. Overall then, a confluence 
of factors from the domestic and international levels led to both CICIG’s rise 
and decline.
Now, how do the different IR-theories discussed earlier fare in explaining the 
rise and decline of the new hybrid commissions? As a cursory analysis of the 
genesis, evolution, and demise of CICIG demonstrates, the classical, billiard-
ball model proposed by neo-realism is of little help in understanding why 
these new actors have emerged. While coercive or utilitarian compliance as 
a result of external pressure (mainly coming from the US) did play a decisive 
role – which would support a rational choice-based explanation – it was not 
the only relevant factor in the equation. Rather, domestic variables played a 
critical role in conjunction with external factors. Therefore, in order to un-
derstand the rise and decline of the new hybrid commissions, parsimonious 
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theories will not do. Rather, theoretical approaches combining factors from 
different levels of analysis seem to be best suited to explain why these com-
missions have emerged and why they are being killed off. 
As regards the genesis of the new hybrids, at first glance, a sociological institu-
tionalist explanation focusing on legitimacy-seeking behavior of governments 
with dubious credentials seems to have a certain explanatory power, as presi-
dent Portillo apparently viewed the creation of an anti-impunity commission 
as a low-cost legitimating maneuver to rehabilitate his administration in the 
eyes of the international community. However, upon closer inspection it turns 
out that an exclusive focus on systemic influences as proposed by sociologi-
cal institutionalism cannot fully solve the puzzle of CICIG’s creation, as the 
initial impulse for its establishment came from domestic civil society, which 
sociological institutionalism does not take into account. 
The genesis of CICIG moreover demonstrates that states are not monolithic 
blocks or black boxes, as IR-realism would have it. Instead, one must disag-
gregate state actors and explore how the different players within the govern-
ment (and other state agencies) ally with other actors in the pursuit of their 
goals. In the Berger administration, for instance, the influence of an indiffer-
ent president was counteracted by the lobbying of his deputy Stein and inte-
rior minister Vielman, who strategically allied with civil society actors, legal 
experts, etc. to bring CICIG to life even against significant domestic pressure 
from Congress and others. The importance of these ‘compliance constituen-
cies’ to the survival of the new hybrid commissions cannot be underestimat-
ed. The Guatemalan Spring, triggered by CICIG’s revelation of the La Linea 
scandal, demonstrates the political clout of these compliance constituencies, 
which corroborates IR-theoretical approaches such as constructivism or lib-
eralism that stress the salience of domestic civil society. 
This, however, does not imply that external factors such as coercive pres-
sures applied by powerful states were insignificant to the fate of CICIG. In-
stead, support from donor countries, especially the US, was vital at every 
critical juncture CICIG faced. The importance of external coercion became 
particularly obvious when the Trump administration decided to withdraw its 
support for CICIG in return for political favors by the Morales administra-
tion, thereby sealing CICIG’s fate. While counterfactual reasoning is always 
fraught with uncertainty, it seems plausible to assume that had the Trump ad-
ministration thrown its full weight behind the embattled commission instead 
of giving Morales a green light to expel it, CICIG would have survived longer. 
Continuing domestic support for CICIG was thus not sufficient to prevent the 
termination of its mandate, as this support could not be translated into clear 
political party positions. A theoretical approach focusing primarily on domes-
tic variables such as liberalism thus seems equally ill-equipped to understand 
the successes and failures of CICIG.
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In sum, then, a cursory analysis of the factors that were salient during CICIG’s 
life span shows that its establishment, consolidation and decay was caused by 
a confluence of variables from the sub-systemic and systemic levels of analy-
sis, requiring a complex theoretical approach such as constructivism, which 
looks at how different (domestic and international) elements of the compli-
ance constituency interact. Further research should explore this interaction 
in more detail, especially with a view to testing the causal linkages outlined 
above across cases of new hybrids such as CEICCE and CICIES, once these 
have been in operation for a sufficient period of time. 
6 Conclusion
Earlier on, I argued that we are witnessing a hybrid turn in global governance, 
a trend which has manifested itself inter alia in the emergence of the new anti-
impunity commissions that have proliferated in Latin America over the past 
one-and-a-half decades. As these new hybrids are extremely understudied, the 
goal of this contribution was to map a research agenda that would address 
the rise and decline of these commissions. Future research should focus on 
generating broader theoretical propositions addressing why these commis-
sions emerge in the first place, why they succeed, and why they fail. Currently, 
we have only case-specific and anecdotal evidence; more systematic and com-
parative analysis is thus required in order to arrive at theoretical generaliza-
tions that would help us to make sense of the hybrid turn. As the different 
hybrid commissions surveyed in this research paper were born (and died) at 
different points in time and varied in terms of the length of their life-span – 
with CICIG surviving for about a decade and a half, which allowed it to ma-
ture into a consolidated institution; MACCIH being initiated about a decade 
later and terminated after a rather short life-span of not even five years; and 
CICIES and CEICCE just having been launched recently – inter-institutional 
comparisons should yield interesting insights not only into the dynamics of 
diffusion but also into the short-, medium-, and long-term effects of these new 
hybrid commissions.
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Abstract
In a variety of issue-areas in global governance, hybrid solutions have been experi-
mented with in order to address the dilemma created by the export of Western tem-
plates of good governance, democracy, the rule of law, etc. to non-Western contexts. 
The latest manifestation of this global trend towards hybridity are hybrid anti-im-
punity commissions which have begun to proliferate in Latin America, and which 
are likely to produce ripple-effects beyond the continent. Their prototype, the Co-
mision Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala (CICIG), was deployed 
in Guatemala; later, variants of CICIG were created in Honduras, El Salvador, and 
Ecuador. However, the new hybrids remain largely underresearched. This contribu-
tion therefore discusses the state of art and outlines a research agenda on these new 
hybrid commissions, arguing that, on the one hand, the effects of these mechanisms 
require further scrutiny – how do hybrid anti-impunity commissions shape a variety 
of possible outcomes including the rule of law, statehood, sovereignty, democracy, 
and the like? On the other hand, we should investigate the factors that contribute 
to the establishment, successes, and failures of these hybrids, thus treating them as 
outcomes to be explained.
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International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala; Mission to Support the 
Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras.
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